

CtW Investment Group

Board of Directors
Allegiant Travel Co.
Corporate Secretary
1201 N. Town Center Drive
Las Vegas
Nevada, 89144

January 26, 2016

Dear Allegiant Board Members:

At the annual shareholder meeting in June, public shareholders signaled a clear lack of confidence in former CFO Linda Marvin's leadership of the Audit Committee. Concerned at the Audit Committee's approval of \$9.3 million in highly questionable related transactions between the company and CEO Maurice Gallagher, and troubled by Ms. Marvin's lengthy professional association with Gallagher, 47% of public shareholders opposed her re-election. Recent negative publicity over airplane safety and ongoing investigations into in-flight incidents by the Federal Aviation Administration lend urgency to Ms. Marvin's swift replacement to ensure rigorous, independent oversight of regulatory compliance by our Audit Committee; and to the initiation of a broader overhaul of board composition and committee structure.

Accordingly, we request that the board immediately: (1) engage an outside search firm to recruit new independent directors to replace Ms. Marvin and to expand the overall size of our board, (2) reconstitute a majority of the Audit Committee with newly recruited directors; and (3) establish a standalone safety committee of the board – the prevalent governance practice across the industry. These reforms are vital to assuring customers and shareholders of Allegiant's safety and compliance procedures, especially given both the company's prodigious growth and reliance on using and acquiring older aircraft.

In addition, (4) we request the suspension of all related transactions with CEO Gallagher, including the \$2.5 million annual sponsorship of his son's NASCAR team, until the Audit Committee has been thoroughly overhauled. It is incredible that the current committee – which also includes two other long-time associates of CEO Gallagher, John Redmond and Gary Ellmer – can exercise appropriate independence and objectivity in assessing transactions which “blur the lines between personal and corporate investment,” as Institutional Shareholder Services put it in recommending against Ms. Marvin.

The CtW Investment Group works with pension funds sponsored by unions affiliated with Change to Win, a federation of unions representing nearly 5.5 million members, to enhance long-term shareholder value through active ownership. These funds invest over \$250 billion in the global capital markets and are substantial investors in Allegiant. Ahead of this year's shareholder meeting, we reached out to investors representing over 50% of the company's outstanding stock as well as the major proxy advisory firms to share and discuss our concerns.

Former CFO Linda Marvin Lacks the ‘Critical Distance’ from CEO Gallagher to Serve as Audit Committee Chair and Should Leave the Board

It may be true that Ms. Marvin’s experience as Allegiant’s CFO until 2007 “adds valuable knowledge to [the] board,” as you state in the proxy, but this comes at far higher costs to the Audit Committee’s independence and objectivity. With the committee’s primary purpose being to bolster investor confidence in the company’s numbers, its legal and regulatory compliance, and related party transactions, shareholders require absolute assurance in the objectivity and independence of its members; even the perception that those qualities are tainted undermine its role. For this reason, it is exceedingly rare to have a former employee, let alone a previous CFO, serving on this key committee.

Our analysis of analysis of the Russell 3000 indicates that there are just six other instances of a former CFO (or CEO) of equal or more recent employment as Ms. Marvin serving on the Audit Committee. And just one of those serves, like Ms. Marvin, as chair of the Audit Committee. Besides the risk of excessive deference to management that comes with any former executive serving as an independent director, having a former CFO head the Audit Committee sets up the awkward situation in which the same individual is responsible for independently overseeing the processes and controls that they may well have put in place as CFO or oversee compliance issues that could have developed under the previous tenure. At a minimum, the risk is in having Ms. Marvin oversee the performance of a former deputy; current CFO Scott Sheldon, we note, served as Director of Accounting during Ms. Marvin’s tenure as CFO. Compounding this challenge is the fact that Mr. Sheldon is the nephew of former Allegiant director and long-time business associate of CEO Gallagher, Timothy Flynn; together CEO Gallagher and Mr. Flynn founded ValuJet and WestAir and are partners, along with Audit Committee member John Redmond (see below), in the investment consortium owning our company’s headquarters.

Considering Ms. Marvin’s extensive professional history with Mr. Gallagher -- serving as an executive under Gallagher at WestAir and MPower, in addition to her role as CFO of Allegiant – it is difficult to view her appointment to the board in 2013 stemming from anything else but her longstanding relationship with Gallagher. (Indeed, we note that at least until 2014, they had lived within a mile of each other for over a decade.)

Unfortunately, similar independence concerns attach to Gary Ellmer and John Redmond, two of the three other Audit Committee members. Mr. Ellmer, who like Ms. Marvin has no other public board service, served alongside Mr. Gallagher at WestAir. Mr. Redmond, meanwhile, continues the board’s relationship with business partners of CEO Gallagher. Mr. Redmond, like former director Timothy Flynn (2006 to 2013), is an eleven percent partner alongside CEO Gallagher (30%) in the limited liability company that owns the company’s headquarters and adjacent property.

Related Party Transactions with CEO Gallagher Should be Suspended until a Newly Composed Audit Committee Can Vet Appropriateness of Payments

Equaling nearly a third of the 2014 Selling, General and Administrative expense (the line item under which many of these costs are recorded) and equivalent to 10% of net income, the \$9.3 million in new related transactions with CEO Gallagher disclosed in this year’s proxy are both highly material and seemingly at odds with the company’s very low cost structure.

Particularly troubling is the apparently superfluous, tangential nature of many of these transactions to Allegiant's business – indeed, the company refers to several of these as “noncore special projects” – and yet they are potentially valuable personal benefits to CEO Gallagher. Most glaring is the company's sponsorship of CEO Gallagher son's NASCAR career to the tune of \$2.5 million and the \$2.8 million paid to Alpine Labs, co-founded by CEO Gallagher, for the production of a TV game show filmed on Allegiant flights. Together, these expenses equal 88% of the company's advertising budget. (See appendix for a breakdown of the related transaction concerns.)

Until a reconstituted Audit Committee is in place to independently and objectively evaluate the merits and terms of these transactions, we request the suspension of all corporate funding of CEO Gallagher's NASCAR team and the production of any further Game Plane episodes. We are not aware of any company disclosures quantifying the returns to these investments and note that on the topic of Game Plane, company VP Brian Davis told the Los Angeles Times that he didn't know whether the game show had played a direct role in boosting the carrier's popularity or profit¹.

Board Structure and Practices Have Failed to Keep Pace with Allegiant's Growth and Must be Reformed

While shareholders have benefited from the company's prodigious growth, as revenue has more than quadrupled since the initial public offering and the company's valuation has grown to more than \$3.4 billion, shareholders have been ill-served by the board's failure to concomitantly develop its governance structure to better reflect its changed structure.

Allegiant may have ceased to be a controlled company in 2007, but the board's composition, oversight and responsiveness have failed to keep pace with this critical shift to majority public ownership. To start, the board needs a more expansive and robust director recruitment process. Besides the lengthy ties Ms. Marvin and Messrs. Redmond and Ellmer share with CEO Gallagher, outlined above, we note that Montie Brewer was initially recommended to the board in 2009 by CEO Gallagher. It thus appears that at least four of our five independent directors were identified as candidates by virtue of their relationship to CEO Gallagher. Moreover, while we think industry experience is vital for a board, with only one member of the board coming from a professional background outside of the industry – and that director being Mr. Redmond – Allegiant needs to dramatically widen the talent pools from which it selects directors. Rather than a strength, the board's concentration of experience is suggestive of a highly constricted recruitment process.

The integrity of this entire process is further undermined by Ms. Marvin and Mr. Ellmer making up two-thirds of the Nominating Committee (Mr. Brewer being the other member), the absence of a designated chair and the committee having met just once in each of the past seven years (2008 – 2014). We note that according to a 2013 Ernst & Young study, a mid-cap company's nominating committee meets on average 4 times year. The same study also finds that the average mid-cap board size is ten and for mid-cap airlines is eleven - or in either case almost twice the size of our board. It is clear to us that the board's size, composition and performance are badly in need of an upgrade.

¹ “Onboard game show brings publicity, fund to Allegiant Air, January 18, 2015, The Los Angeles Times (<http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-onboard-game-show-allegiant-air-20150116-story.html>).

F.A.A. Compliance Failures, Safety Scares, Aging Fleet, Heighten Concerns over the Audit Committee and Indicate the Need for a Standalone Safety Committee

The past year has seen a string of prominent safety incidents involving Allegiant flights, prompting several FAA investigations and a wave of negative publicity for our company (including landing Allegiant in the Wall Street Journal's "Crisis of the week" column).² And last week, we note, COO Steve Harfst abruptly resigned after less than 18 months at the company.

Questions have also been raised over the adequacy of disclosures surrounding regulatory compliance, while the company's own pilots have pointed to a corporate culture where profits come before safety. The emergency landing in Fargo, ND, in July of an Allegiant flight running low on fuel should be a wakeup call. The incident not only follows a string of in-flight safety incidences over the prior months, but occurred on a flight piloted by two licensed executives, one being our director of flight safety, and appears to have been wholly avoidable if the pilots had adequately reviewed, as they are required before each flight, an FAA Notice to Airmen, which indicated that the Fargo Airport was closed due to a Blue Angels display. Besides the emergency itself, Allegiant was criticized in the Wall Street Journal for its public response to the incident, as several "crisis experts" expressed concern at the company's overly defensive posture in addressing passenger and investor concerns over safety, particularly given the rash of incidents on company flights.

As of September 8, 2015, the Las Vegas Review Journal reported 17 "unusual incidents" in 2015 involving Allegiant flights, including emergency landings, flight diversions or aborted takeoffs,³ while the FAA says it has "several" ongoing regulatory investigations. The company had a further five emergency landings out of Florida in the last week of the year.⁴

Separately, according to a New York Times article, Allegiant pilots have identified at least 65 incidents in the period from September 2014 to March 2015, where flights were forced to divert, return to gates or abort takeoff because of mechanical or engine problems.⁵ In a report sent to Congress and the F.A.A., the pilots contend that a combination of poorly trained mechanics, insufficient spare parts, and an aging fleet is "creating a dangerous paradigm that could eventually lead to an accident resulting in serious injury and loss of life."

In the same article, the New York Times reported on previously undisclosed problems in the airline's maintenance and training programs identified in 2013 during a routine F.A.A. inspection. Determining the current training was not effective in identifying systemic deficiencies or distinguishing between major and minor repairs, the F.A.A. forced a six-month shut down of the company's training programs and a freeze in new plane deliveries. Although Allegiant's SEC filings routinely warn of the material risks

² "Crisis of the Week: Allegiant Emergency Landing Fuels Controversy," August 10, 2015, The Wall Street Journal (<http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/08/10/crisis-of-the-week-allegiant-emergency-landing-fuels-controversy/>).

³ "Allegiant flight to Las Vegas diverted due to maintenance issue," September 8, 2015, Las Vegas Review-Journal (<http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/nevada/allegiant-flight-las-vegas-diverted-due-maintenance-issue>).

⁴ <http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/airlines/allegiant-air-had-five-emergency-landings-out-of-florida-during-holiday/2259958>

⁵ "Pilots Fault Allegiant on Safety as Talks Stall," April 20, 2015, The New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/21/business/pilots-at-allegiant-air-question-safety-standards.html?_r=0).

from possible shortages of both pilots and aircraft, there can also be risks from failures to meet regulatory standards.

With a key responsibility of the Audit Committee being to ensure that management has established and maintained processes to assure compliance with key regulations impacting the company, particularly those that could have significant impact on the company's financials, these developments heighten the urgency for bolstering the committee's independence from CEO Gallagher. They also underscore the need to establish a board safety committee. Almost all of Allegiant's US peers have standalone committees to oversee management's internal control processes and other activities regarding operational safety and compliance with applicable laws and regulations, rather than subsume the responsibility under the general mandate of the audit committee, which has other significant responsibilities. Indeed, considering that a key element of Allegiant's business model is the reliance on older aircraft,⁶ which require more extensive maintenance, a board committee that focuses exclusively on safety would appear long overdue.

We look forward to a timely response to this request and a forthcoming public announcement. In the meantime, please feel free to contact my colleague Michael Pryce-Jones at 202-721-6079.

Sincerely,

Dieter Waizenegger



Executive Director, CtW Investment Group

⁶ The company's fleet is more than twice the median age of other airline fleets and the average age of Allegiant's aircraft is close to the average economic life of these aircraft models.

Appendix – CEO Gallagher’s Related Party Transactions

Alpine Labs: A video production company co-founded and 25% owned by CEO Gallagher, Alpine Labs received \$2.8m for the production of a game show on the company’s flights, “Game Plane,” with passengers participating. Forty episodes have been produced and the show has been syndicated across local TV networks. Significantly, at last November’s analyst day, the company conceded that it will take time to gauge the degree of success the show achieves on broadcast TV -- an observation that only serves to highlight the hazard to shareholders from such an unconventional and in fact untried marketing strategy in the industry. Piloting a new TV show is inherently risky, and while this uncertainty is something that a CBS or NBC must assume in the course of their business, it is far from an unavoidable risk for a low-cost air carrier with a limited budget. In fact, VP of Marketing Brian Davis told the Los Angeles Times that while the show was liked by passengers, he didn’t know whether the game show had played a direct role in boosting the carrier’s popularity or profit.

GMS Racing: Allegiant’s lead sponsorship of CEO Gallagher’s racing team, for which his son drives, jumped from an initial \$250,000 in 2011, when GMS first entered ARCA competition, to \$2.5 million in 2014 as the team embarked on a full-time entry into the NASCAR Camping World Truck Series. We note that a recent special interview with Spencer Gallagher in Motorsport.com put the relationship this way: “Allegiant has expanded its profits [since its IPO in 2004] which has enabled CEO Gallagher to gather the funding to stick his company’s logo on his son’s vehicles.” Certainly what is clear is that Allegiant’s rising sponsorship has grown in tandem with the racing aspirations of the team. Even if NASCAR sponsorship makes business sense, it is difficult to view the sponsorship of this team and the CEO’s son as anything but a clear case of favoritism.

Adapt Courseware LLC: In 2014, the Audit Committee also approved payments of up to \$4 million (\$828,000 in 2014 and up to an additional \$3.26 million in the future) to Adapt Courseware, a company controlled by CEO Gallagher and specializing in developing online teaching tools, to build training modules. The company states that it expects that the investment “will reduce training costs.” Assuming these costs are reported as other operating expenses, the overall commitment is equivalent to 7% of the 2014 total line item.